veASHA Voting System

Vote-escrowed token mechanics for governance, including delegation, pessimistic vote casting, and coercion-resistant anonymous voting.

veASHA Voting System

The Pars Protocol governance system uses vote-escrowed tokens (veASHA) to ensure that voting power reflects long-term commitment to the protocol. This page details the mechanics of voting, delegation, and coercion resistance.

Voting Power

veASHA Calculation

Voting power is determined by the amount of ASHA locked and the lock duration:

veASHA = ASHA_amount × (remaining_lock_time / max_lock_time)

Lock Duration	Initial Weight	Notes
1 week	0.0048x	Minimum lock period
1 month	0.021x
6 months	0.125x
1 year	0.25x
2 years	0.50x
4 years	1.00x	Maximum weight

Voting power decays linearly as the lock approaches expiry. A 4-year lock of 1,000 ASHA starts at 1,000 veASHA and decreases to 0 at expiry.

Lock Management

interface IVeASHA {
    /// @notice Lock ASHA tokens to receive veASHA
    function lock(uint256 amount, uint256 duration) external returns (uint256 lockId);

    /// @notice Extend an existing lock duration
    function extendLock(uint256 lockId, uint256 newDuration) external;

    /// @notice Add more ASHA to an existing lock
    function increaseLock(uint256 lockId, uint256 additionalAmount) external;

    /// @notice Withdraw ASHA after lock expires
    function withdraw(uint256 lockId) external;

    /// @notice Get current voting power
    function votingPower(address account) external view returns (uint256);
}

Delegation

veASHA holders can delegate their voting power to any address:

Delegation Rules

Delegate to only one address at a time
Entire balance is delegated (no partial delegation)
Self-delegation is supported and common
Changes to delegator's balance automatically adjust delegatee's power
Delegation persists until explicitly changed

Delegation Methods

Direct Delegation: Call delegate(address delegatee) on the veASHA contract
Signature Delegation: Off-chain signature via delegateBySig() for gasless delegation

Delegation UI

Manage delegations at pars.vote/delegate:

View current delegation status
Delegate to any address
Self-delegate for direct voting
View delegation history

Pessimistic Vote Casting

The voting system uses pessimistic vote casting to prevent manipulation:

function castVoteInternal(
    address voter,
    uint256 resolutionId,
    uint8 support
) internal returns (uint256) {
    // Get votes at resolution start and current time
    uint256 originalVotes = veasha.getPriorVotes(voter, resolution.startBlock);
    uint256 currentVotes = veasha.getPriorVotes(voter, block.number);

    // Use minimum of the two
    uint256 votes = currentVotes > originalVotes ? originalVotes : currentVotes;

    return votes;
}

Examples

Voter	At Resolution Start	When Voting	Counted Votes
Alice	0 veASHA	100 veASHA	0 veASHA
Bob	100 veASHA	0 veASHA	0 veASHA
Carol	100 veASHA	100 veASHA	100 veASHA
Dan	50 veASHA	100 veASHA	50 veASHA

This prevents voters from buying influence after a resolution is submitted.

Vote Options

Three vote options are available:

Option	Value	Description
Against	0	Vote against the resolution
For	1	Vote for the resolution
Abstain	2	Abstain (counts toward quorum)

Resolution Approval

A resolution passes if it meets both requirements:

1. Quorum

Minimum number of FOR votes required:

quorumVotes = (veASHA_totalSupply × quorumPct) / 100_000

Current quorum: 10% of circulating veASHA

2. Approval Threshold

Minimum percentage of votes that must be FOR:

approval = (forVotes × 100_000) / (forVotes + againstVotes)

Current threshold: 50% (simple majority)

For large treasury allocations (>$100K), super-majority is required: 67%

Coercion-Resistant Voting

For voters in high-threat environments, anonymous voting mode protects against coercion.

Anonymous Voting Flow

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                    ANONYMOUS VOTING FLOW                         │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                                  │
│   Voter                    Contract                              │
│     │                         │                                  │
│     │  1. Commit (hash of     │                                  │
│     │     vote + nullifier)   │                                  │
│     │ ───────────────────────►│                                  │
│     │                         │                                  │
│     │  2. ZK Proof:           │                                  │
│     │     - I hold veASHA     │                                  │
│     │     - My vote is valid  │                                  │
│     │     - Nullifier unused  │                                  │
│     │ ───────────────────────►│                                  │
│     │                         │                                  │
│     │  3. Vote recorded       │                                  │
│     │     (anonymous)         │                                  │
│     │ ◄───────────────────────│                                  │
│                                                                  │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Privacy Guarantees

Feature	Protection
ZK Eligibility	Proves veASHA holdings without revealing address
Nullifier	Prevents double-voting without linking votes
Deniability	Voter can produce fake receipt showing any direction
Unlinkability	No connection between address and vote

When to Use Anonymous Voting

Living in or connected to high-threat jurisdictions
Concerns about vote coercion or surveillance
Desire to keep voting preferences private
Whistleblower protection scenarios

Voting Eligibility Table

veASHA Type	Standard Voting	Anonymous Voting
veASHA in wallet	Direct	Via ZK proof
veASHA in Advance collateral	Requires delegation	Via ZK proof
veASHA on Pars L2	Direct	Via ZK proof
veASHA on other chains	Snapshot only	Not available

Post-Quantum Signatures

All votes support ML-DSA (FIPS 204) post-quantum signatures:

interface IPQVoting {
    /// @notice Cast vote using ML-DSA signature
    function castVotePQ(
        uint256 resolutionId,
        uint8 support,
        bytes memory pqPublicKey,
        bytes memory pqSignature
    ) external;
}

This uses the ML-DSA precompile at 0x0601 on Pars Network.

Voting Best Practices

For Individual Voters

Lock for longer periods to maximize voting power
Self-delegate to ensure your votes count
Review resolutions during the 3-day delay before voting starts
Vote early in the 7-day voting period
Use anonymous mode if you have privacy concerns

For Delegates

Communicate your positions before major votes
Vote consistently with stated principles
Participate in Town Halls (PIP-7001) for discussion
Respond to delegator questions promptly

Charter – Constitutional document
Pars Council – Council governance structure
Resolutions – Resolution lifecycle
veASHA Token – Token mechanics
PIP-7006: ASHA Reserve Token

veASHA Voting System

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