Pars Protocol

Pars Council

The decentralized governance body that controls Pars Protocol through on-chain voting and veASHA token-based governance.

Pars Council (شورا)

The Pars Council (شورا - Shura) is the decentralized governance body that controls Pars Protocol. All protocol parameters, treasury allocations, and system upgrades require Council approval through on-chain voting.

Governance Architecture

The Council operates through three layers:

  1. veASHA Token – Vote-escrowed ASHA for governance participation
  2. Governor Module – On-chain proposal and voting system
  3. Safe Multisig – Execution layer with threshold signing
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                        PARS COUNCIL (شورا)                        │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                                  │
│  TOKEN LAYER                                                    │
│  ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐  │
│  │  ASHA ──► Lock ──► veASHA (vote-escrowed)                 │  │
│  │                                                           │  │
│  │  Lock Duration     Voting Weight                          │  │
│  │  ─────────────     ─────────────                          │  │
│  │  1 week            0.0048x                                │  │
│  │  1 month           0.021x                                 │  │
│  │  6 months          0.125x                                 │  │
│  │  1 year            0.25x                                  │  │
│  │  2 years           0.50x                                  │  │
│  │  4 years           1.00x (maximum)                        │  │
│  └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘  │
│                               │                                  │
│                               ▼                                  │
│  PROPOSAL LAYER (Governor Module)                               │
│  ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐  │
│  │  Draft ──► Active (7 days) ──► Queued (48h) ──► Executed  │  │
│  └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘  │
│                               │                                  │
│                               ▼                                  │
│  EXECUTION LAYER (Safe 3-of-5)                                  │
│  ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐  │
│  │  Threshold signers execute approved resolutions            │  │
│  └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘  │
│                                                                  │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Token Architecture

ASHA Reserve Token

ASHA (آشا) is the sole reserve token of Pars Protocol:

  • Role: Reserve currency backed by treasury assets
  • Mintable: Only through bonding collateral
  • Backing: Protocol treasury (stables, ETH, PARS, LP tokens)

Users obtain ASHA by bonding collateral assets at a discount:

Collateral TierAssetsDiscount Range
SUSDC, USDT, DAI3-8%
AETH, WETH5-12%
BPARS8-18%
CCYRUS, MIGA10-22%
DLP Tokens12-25%

veASHA Governance Token

veASHA is obtained by locking ASHA and is the only way to participate in governance:

  • Minimum lock: 1 week
  • Maximum lock: 4 years
  • Voting power: Linear weighting based on lock duration, decays over time
veASHA_weight = ASHA_amount × (lock_duration / max_duration)
Lock DurationWeight Multiplier
1 week0.0048x
1 month0.021x
6 months0.125x
1 year0.25x
2 years0.50x
4 years1.00x

Delegation

veASHA holders can delegate voting rights to any address:

  • Delegate to only one address at a time
  • Entire balance is delegated (no partial delegation)
  • Changes to token balance automatically adjust delegatee's power
  • Delegation persists until explicitly changed

Governor Module

The Governor Module implements on-chain voting with these key features:

Percent-Based Thresholds

Thresholds scale with veASHA supply to prevent governance capture:

ParameterValueDescription
Proposal Threshold0.25%Minimum veASHA to submit a resolution
Quorum10%Minimum participation for valid vote
Approval Threshold50%Percentage of votes required to pass
Super-majority67%Required for treasury >$100K

Voting Parameters

ParameterValueDescription
Voting Delay3 daysReview period before voting begins
Voting Period7 daysDuration of active voting
Timelock48 hoursDelay before execution
Grace Period24 hoursWindow for activation/execution

Pessimistic Vote Casting

The Council uses pessimistic vote casting to prevent manipulation:

  • Votes counted as minimum of balance at proposal start and current balance
  • Prevents voters from buying influence after proposal submission
  • Ensures consistent voting power throughout the process

Safe Multisig Execution

Approved resolutions are executed by a Safe multisig:

  • Standard operations: 3-of-5 signers
  • Large transfers (>$100K): 4-of-5 signers
  • Emergency freeze: 2-of-5 signers can pause for 72 hours

Signer Elections

Signers are elected by veASHA holders:

  • 6-month terms with staggered rotation
  • Any signer can be removed by governance vote
  • Hardware wallet requirement for all signers

Fractal Governance

Pars DAO uses fractal governance where the same patterns repeat at every level:

Hierarchy

L1 PARS DAO (Sovereign)
├── L2 COMMITTEES (Standing)
│   ├── Security (AMN)     → SECURITY identity token
│   ├── Treasury (KHAZ)    → TREASURY identity token
│   ├── Governance (DAD)   → GOVERN identity token
│   ├── Health (SAL)       → HEALTH identity token
│   ├── Culture (FARH)     → CULTURE identity token
│   ├── Research (DAN)     → RESEARCH identity token
│   ├── Infrastructure (SAZ) → INFRA identity token
│   ├── Consular (PAY)     → CONSULAR identity token
│   ├── Venture (WAQF)     → VENTURE identity token
│   └── Impact (MIZ)       → IMPACT identity token
├── L2 WORKING GROUPS (Temporary)
│   └── Task-specific, time-limited, all funds recallable
└── L2 SUB-DAOs (Independent)
    ├── MIGA DAO → MIGA token
    └── CYRUS DAO → CYRUS token

Fund Source Rules

SourceDescriptionParent Recallable?
ALLOCATEDBudget from parent DAOYes
BONDEDUser-purchased via bondsNo

This preserves community sovereignty while maintaining parent oversight.

Veto and Sanction

Parent DAOs have limited oversight over children:

Veto Power

  • Parent can veto child proposals during timelock period
  • Requires threshold of parent veASHA voters
  • Must provide public rationale

Sanction Guard

  • Blocks execution of vetoed proposals
  • Can implement temporary freeze (max 7 days)
  • Child continues with bonded funds after sanction

Censorship Resistance

The Council is designed to function under adversarial conditions:

On-Chain Governance

  • All resolutions and votes recorded on Pars Network
  • No dependence on centralized governance portals
  • Direct contract interaction always available

Mesh Network Access

  • Governance portal accessible via Pars mesh (PIP-0001)
  • Functions during internet blackouts
  • Gossip protocol distributes proposals to isolated nodes

Post-Quantum Signatures

  • ML-DSA signatures supported for all governance actions
  • Protects against quantum key extraction
  • Future-proof against cryptographic advances

Coercion-Resistant Voting

For voters in high-threat environments, anonymous voting is available:

  1. ZK Proof of Eligibility: Prove veASHA holdings without revealing address
  2. Anonymous Ballot: Cast vote via zero-knowledge proof
  3. Nullifier: Prevents double-voting without revealing identity
  4. Deniability: Generate fake receipts showing any vote direction

Governance Portal

The official governance interface is available at pars.vote:

  • Browse and create resolutions
  • Manage ASHA locks and veASHA
  • Delegate voting power
  • View voting history
  • Access via mesh network during censorship events

Emergency Procedures

Emergency Freeze

Any 2-of-5 Safe signers can trigger an emergency freeze:

  • Duration: 72 hours maximum
  • Effect: All pending transactions paused
  • Extension: Requires governance vote

Veto Guardian

The Emergency Multisig serves as Veto Guardian:

  • Can veto malicious resolutions within timelock period
  • Prevents governance attacks during review period
  • Accountability to Council for any veto

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